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CASES NOTED
That the situs of the debt was held to be here in the United States
could very easily have been anticipated, due to the lack of any contrary
precedents upon which the Court could rely. It has long been the policy
of the courts to decide the situs of intangible property on the basis of
their concept of justice, rather than on any hard and fast rule of law."
Nor is the fact that the Court found the outstanding power of
attorney to be valid very surprising; this, too, is a matter which was
decided at the judge's discretion and by his innate sense of justice.
The greatest importance of Tabacalera is that it sets a tentative
limit to the Sabbatino decision, even without the use of the Hickenlooper
Amendment. The purpose of the Amendment is to protect American
citizens from confiscations of their property by hostile foreign govern-
ments;" it makes no mention of foreign creditors who seek relief, in
American courts, from confiscatory decrees imposed by their own
governments. The practical effect of Tabacalera is to fill a gap which
Sabbatino had opened but which the Hickenlooper Amendment had not
completely closed.
If for no other reason than that it prevents unjust enrichment, this
writer believes the Tabacalera decision to be a sound one. A contrary
result would not seem to further the concept of justice as it should exist
in American courts. Permitting a debtor to refuse to pay a bona fide
foreign creditor who is here in the United States, and yet at the same
time discouraging him from sending that same debt to the foreign country
on the grounds that it is against public policy to trade with unfriendly
nations, is a philosophy which should not be sanctioned by any court
of law.
GEORGE R. HARPER
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE-SETOFF OF AMOUNTS
PAYABLE UNDER MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE
The plaintiff-insured was involved in a collision with a negligently
operated uninsured vehicle. The defendant-insurer had issued to the plain-
tiff a policy which included both medical payment and uninsured motorist
endorsements, but specifically excepted from payment under the latter
coverage amounts paid or payable under the former. The plaintiff sought
a declaratory judgment to determine whether the setoff provision con-
37. Needless to say, the problems inherent in determining the location of intangibles
will, in many cases, enable the forum to reach virtually any result of its choosing.
A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 48, 172 (1962). See also § 242 of
the same work.
38. The legislative history of the Hickenlooper Amendment leaves no doubt that it in-
tends for international law to require compensation for confiscated American property. See S.
REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19; 110 CONG. REc. 18936-37, 18946 (1964); 110 CONG.
REC. App. A5157 (1964).
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flicted with the coverage required by statute.' The District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, affirmed the trial court's holding that such provisions
were consistent with the statute. 2 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of
Florida held, reversed and remanded: The setoff provision amounted to
a reduction of the insurer's limit of liability below the statutory minimum,
and further contravened the statute by requiring a showing of unreim-
bursed loss rather than legal damage. Tuggle v. Government Employees
Insurance Co., 207 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1968).1
The Supreme Court's decision in Tuggle is a further extension of
Florida's increasingly restrictive attitude toward insurers' attempts to
limit their liability under uninsured motorist coverage. The question of
setoff of amounts payable under medical payments arose first in Sims v.
National Casualty Co.4 In Sims, since there was no provision in the policy
for setoff, the district court of appeal held that the coverages were inde-
pendent and separately contracted for, and the insurer's statutory right
of subrogation against the wrongdoer did not imply the existence of a
right to such a setoff. The Sims court distinguished the Louisiana case of
Gunter v. Lord' where the tortfeasor's insurer was not required to pay
1. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1967):
(1) No automobile liability insurance, covering liability arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery
in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in
this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less
than the limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved
by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting there-
from; provided, however, that the coverage required under this section shall not be
applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage; provided
further that, unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, the cover-
age need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named
insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to
him by the same insurer.
(2) For the purposes of this coverage the term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall,
subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include an in-
sured motor vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment
with respect to the legal liability of its insured within the limits specified therein
because of insolvency.
(3) An insurer's insolvency protection shall be applicable only to accidents
occurring during a policy period in which its insured's uninsured motorist coverage
is in effect where the liability insurer of the tort-feasor becomes insolvent within
one year after such an accident. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prevent any insurer from affording insolvency protection under terms and conditions
more favorable to its insureds than is provided hereunder.
(4) In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this
section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the insurer making
such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any settle-
ment or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such per-
son against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury for
which such payment is made, including the proceeds recoverable from the assets of
the insolvent insurer.
2. Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
3. A companion case arising in the Second District, Damsel v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 207 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1968), was considered to be factually identical and reversed
on the basis of Tuggle.
4. 171 So.2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
5. 242 La. 943, 140 So.2d 11 (1962).
CASES NOTED
the plaintiff under both medical payment and liability coverages, because
the plaintiff in Gunter had paid no premiums and was not entitled to
collect twice.
The Third District relied on its Sims decision in Hack v. Great
American Insurance Co.6 The facts were similar except that the plaintiff
had paid no premiums. Yet, this did not appear to influence the deci-
sion. The court again stressed reliance on the contractual relationship,
and the fact that there were no provisions in the policy which made the
two coverages mutually exclusive.
The first decision on a related point to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Florida was United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Sellers.7
There the district court of appeal had reversed a declaratory decree which
allowed plaintiffs recovery under their own uninsured motorist coverage
after they had recovered under similar coverage applicable to the automo-
bile in which they were passengers. The plaintiffs' policy contained a pro-
vision that its uninsured motorist coverage should apply only as excess in-
surance over any other coverage available, and only to the extent that
the limit of liability exceeded that of the other coverage. The Supreme
Court reversed the First District's decision, holding that an insurer might
not limit its liability pursuant to the statute by such clauses.8 The decision
stressed, however, that "the statute does not intend that an insured shall
pyramid coverages under separate automobile liability insurance policies
so as to recover more than his actual bodily injury loss or damage."9
At about the same time as the Supreme Court's Sellers decision, an-
other limiting clause appearing in most uninsured motorist endorsements
was struck down by the First District. In Standard Accident Insurance
Co. v. Gavin,' the court refused to give effect to a clause providing for
setoff of workmen's compensation benefits. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari," finding that the case was not in conflict with the Third Dis-
trict's decision in Tuggle because the amount set off from what the insurer
was required to pay under uninsured motorist coverage was "supplied and
6. 175 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
7. 179 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
8. Sellers v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1966). But Sellers does
not stand for the unqualified proposition that where two uninsured motorist coverages apply,
neither insurer may deny coverage on the ground that the insured has other insurance avail-
able. The persons required to be protected under the statute are "persons insured" under the
policy's liability coverage (see note 1 infra). As a passenger, Mrs. Sellers was not an insured
under the liability coverage of the car in which she was riding, but the standard uninsured
motorist endorsement goes beyond the statutory requirement to include passengers. The in-
surer under that policy in the Sellers case had already made a settlement and was not a party
to the cause, but there is nothing in the statute to prohibit an "other insurance" provision
respecting persons whose protection the statute does not contemplate at all. See also Note, 21
UNIV. OF Mi ms L. REV. 712 (1966).
9. Id. at 692.
10. 184 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
11. Standard Accident Co. v. Gavin, 196 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
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paid by the insurer under the separately contracted for medical payments
coverage."'
2
In its review of the Tuggle decision, the supreme court receded from
this position, saying,
[W]e find the [Gavin] opinion erroneously included the Tuggle
decision in its pronouncement that "the legal conclusions in each
decision ... are consonant with statutory requirements. ' 3
Prior to the supreme court's review of the Tuggle decision, but subsequent
to its discharge of the writ of certiorari in Gavin (where the Tuggle deci-
sion was apparently distinguished and approved) the First District in
Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Kincaid14 decided that a provision in the policy
for setoff of medical payments was void because it reduced coverage below
the statutory minimum. The court relied largely on the supreme court's
reversal of its decision in Sellers, viz., if policy provisions allowing a setoff
against uninsured motorist coverage are void where the setoff involves
other uninsured motorist coverage, can "a setoff of an entirely separate
and independent coverage" for which a separate premium was paid be
less void? The decision criticized the Third District's decision in Tuggle
as "clearly in conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Sellers and
with our decision in Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Gavin"' because,
in Tuggle, had the offending motorist been insured, the plaintiff "would
have been allowed to recover under the medical expense coverage and to
recover the identical damages from the offending motorist."' 6 The public
policy expressed in the Gavin decision is that the "insured is entitled to
recover under the policy the damages he or she would have been able to
recover if the offending motorist had maintained a policy of liability in-
surance."'7 Shortly thereafter, a provision for setoff of medical payments
was rejected by the Fourth District in State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance
Co. v. Carrico8 on the basis of the supreme court's decision in Sellers.
In Southeast Title and Insurance Co. v. Austin, 9 the supreme court
affirmed a refusal to give effect to a provision for setoff of workmen's com-
pensation benefits from uninsured motorist payments. The court found
such provisions to be "in conflict with both express and implied require-
ments of the law."2 Justice Barns (retired) resolved a three-to-three dead-
lock with a concurring opinion which made it clear that he would not re-
12. Id. at 442.
13. 207 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 1968).
14. 199 So.2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
15. Id. at 774.
16. Id.
17. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 196 So.2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1967). (Quoting from
the First District's opinion in Davis v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 172 So.2d 485, 486
(Fla. 1965).
18. 200 So.2d 265 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
19. 202 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1967).
20. Id. at 181.
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gard the case as precedent for a decision like Tuggle (with which he
vigorously disagreed). The opinion pointed out that both workmen's com-
pensation and uninsured motorist coverage are matters of public policy
and that a provision in an uninsured motorist endorsement intended to
conform to the statute "providing that the insurer shall receive any bene-
fits paid to the insured pursuant to the workmen's compensation law con-
travenes the public policy of this state .... ,21
The majority opinion in Tuggle found the case indistinguishable from
Sellers22 (multiple uninsured motorist carriers) because the two coverages
in the Tuggle policy were separately contracted for, with independent
premiums. The district court's view of the setoff provision as one which
reduced the value and quality of the medical payments coverage "in a
backhanded way"2 was held to be erroneous, reasoning that if medical
payments amounted to $10,000, there would be no uninsured motorist
coverage whatsoever. This point had been expressed earlier in the Phoe-
nix2" case, where the court expressed the view that in that situation the
insurer would retain a statutory right of subrogation in the amount of
$10,000 while having paid nothing at all under uninsured motorist cover-
age. In view of Tuggle, it seems unlikely that a court will now be con-
fronted with that situation, but the court's dictum is, at best, arguable.
In a strongly worded dissenting opinion, Justice Barns distinguished
Tuggle from the results in Southeast,25 Gavin,26 and Sellers,27 which were all
viewed as proper cases for application of the collateral source rule recog-
nized in Florida.2" His dissent pointed out that the two coverages and the
limitation on double indemnity were a contractual agreement between in-
surer and insured "under provisions filed with and approved by the in-
surance commissioner .. .."I' The Insurance Commissioner's approval of
the limitation was seen as consistent with public policy, since otherwise
a higher rate would have been necessary, with a resulting increase in re-
jections of uninsured motorist coverage, to the detriment of the public
welfare.
Although insurers are required by statute to offer uninsured motorist
coverage in some 42 states, and offer it voluntarily in virtually all others,8°
there is a scarcity of decided cases on the effect of setoff and "other insur-
ance" provisions on uninsured motorist coverage. Courts of Virginia,81
21. Id.
22. Sellers v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 185 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
23. Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 487, 489 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
24. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 199 So.2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
25. Southeast Title and Ins. Co. v. Austin, 202 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1967).
26. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 196 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
27. Sellers v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 185 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
28. See, e.g., Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
29. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851(1) (1967). See note 1 supra.
30. See Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 497
(1967).
31. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
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Oregon,82 and South Carolina88 have refused to give effect to such provi-
sions, but this by no means makes it certain that these jurisdictions would
reach the same result as Florida has on the facts of Tuggle. Courts of
Louisiana, 4 Illinois,88 Michigan,8 6 California, 7 Iowa,8 8 and New Hamp-
shire89 have approved various exclusionary clauses relating to medical
payments, workmen's compensation, and other insurance. Since the cases
involve interpretation of statutes which vary from state to state, it would
be meaningless to attempt to formulate a "majority" position on the ac-
ceptance or rejection of such provisions. Similarly, where a jurisdiction
has refused to allow setoff of workmen's compensation benefits, it does
not necessarily follow that setoff of medical payments would be disal-
lowed if the fact pattern of Tuggle were presented.
It is worth noting, however, that the cases cited where setoff or "other
insurance" provisions were not given effect were, for the most part, situa-
tions where the result did not lead to recovery exceeding compensation.
In Bryant,4° for example, the insured was allowed to recover part of a
judgment which had been partially paid by the other insurer. The amount
of the judgment greatly exceeded the sum of the insurers' limits of li-
ability. In Smith,4 two "other insurance" clauses were voided because of
conflict and the loss prorated between the carriers.42 In Vernon,48 the court
voided an "other insurance" provision in the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment of one policy as in conflict with statutory requirements, but declared
that there was no liability on the part of the other insurer because an
"other insurance" clause in the collision endorsement of that policy was
valid.
The result in Tuggle appears to follow logically, if not necessarily,
from the public policy expressed by the supreme court in Gavin.44 How-
ever, a policy that puts a dollar in the pocket of the injured party for every
dollar of compensation for medical expenses, in the face of a contractual
undertaking to the contrary, can hardly be applauded as a sound one.
32. Sparling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Adv. 531 439 P.2d 616 (Ore. 1968) ; Smith v. Pac.
Auto. Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965) ; Peterson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651 (1964).
33. Vernon v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964).
34. Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 195 So.2d 648 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1967),
writ refused 250 La. 638, 197 So.2d 897 (1967) ; LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 791
(La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1967) ; Allen v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 188 So.2d 741 (La.
2d Cir. Ct. App. 1966), writ refused 249 La. 743, 190 So.2d 909 (1966).
35. Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App.2d 364, 202 N.E.2d 126 (1964).
36. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Mesner, 2 Mich. App. 350, 139 N.W.2d 913 (1966).
37. Grunfeld v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App.2d 4, 42 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1965) ; North-
western Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 238 Cal. App.2d 64, 47 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1965).
38. Burchan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963).
39. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 213 A.2d 420 (N.H. 1965).
40. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
41. Smith v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965).
42. See Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage In Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 455 (1962).
43. Vernon v. Harleyville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964).
44. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 196 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
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The numerical frequency of double recoveries arising from the Tuggle rule
will far outnumber those resulting from workmen's compensation and
duplicate uninsured motorist coverages. Indeed, few motorists are incau-
tious enough to venture onto the highways without both uninsured motor-
ist and medical payments coverage. Not only will all those who are so pro-
tected be candidates for double recovery, but many, if not most, of the
cases that would have been double recoveries because of workmen's com-
pensation or duplicate uninsured motorist coverage will now be triple
(and perhaps even quadruple) recoveries.
The difficulty that underlies the announced policy seems to center
around the collateral source rule.45 Tuggle and its antecedents place the
uninsured motorist carrier exactly in the tortfeasor's shoes; he may not
show in mitigation any payment received by the injured party-insured
that the tortfeasor himself would not be allowed to show, notwithstanding
any contractual undertaking to the contrary between insured and insurer.
This seems to stretch the collateral source rule beyond the point where
its application can be defended. The rule is usually stated in terms of in-
jured party versus wrongdoer: the tortfeasor may not mitigate damages
by showing payment "from a source wholly independent of and collateral
to the wrongdoer."46 The extension from the tortfeasor to his liability
insurer is not too difficult to rationalize, though it has been said that the
result of this is to give the injured party a windfall he does not deserve
at the expense of the premium-paying public.47 But there is no explanation
for extending the basically punitive rule that "the wrongdoer deserves to
pay" to an insurer who is doing the paying out of a fund created by the
injured party. The fact, relied on by the Tuggle majority, that the two
coverages were contracted for separately, and with independent premiums,
is indeed to be deplored; the premium for uninsured motorist coverage
should be reduced where there is medical payments coverage and a setoff
provision.4" Moreover, the Insurance Commissioner must, as suggested
in the lower court's decision,49 be relied on to see that reductions in cover-
age are accompanied by commensurate reductions in premiums.5°
45. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN.
L. REV. 669 (1962).
46. 22 Am. Jur., Damages § 206.
47. Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv. L. REV.
741 (1964).
48. See text accompanying note 23, supra.
49. Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., supra note 2 at 489:
It may be assumed that officials charged with a duty or authority to control rates
for premiums will require that in policies containing such a setoff provision the re-
sultant reduction in the value and quality of the medical payment coverage (which
is what it amounts to) will be accompanied by a proportionate reduction in the
premium charged for that coverage. (Emphasis added.)
50. The office of the Insurance Commissioner prepared the following proposed addition
to FLA. STAT. § 627.0851, which was introduced at the 1967 Regular Session of the Legisla-
ture, but was not enacted:
627.0851(5) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as requiring the
forms of coverage provided pursuant to this section to afford more coverage than
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It is suggested that this result could have been obtained by a decision
of less sweeping impact than the one rendered. The case could have been
limited to its facts by holding that a provision for setting off medical pay-
ments against uninsured motorist coverage contravenes public policy and
will not be given effect where the lessened coverage is not reflected in an
appropriately reduced premium. When there is a reduction in the premium,
the aggregate coverage would certainly be more than that prescribed by
the statute, and the cost of that portion of the coverage making up the
statutory minimum requirement would presumably not be different from
the cost of buying uninsured motorist coverage at a higher premium with-
out medical payment coverage. The fact that the required coverage would,
in that case, be supplied under two different endorsements is of no practical
significance; the insured is provided with the statutory protection as cer-
tainly as if he had bought only uninsured motorist coverage.
Under the Tuggle rule, the insured cannot avoid paying an uninsured
motorist premium that contemplates a double recovery, even if he does
not secure that windfall to himself by buying medical payments coverage.
The insurer, on the other hand, can only defend himself against the depre-
dations of an unscrupulous accident victim by shouldering the difficult
burden of showing that the expenses incurred were not reasonably neces-
sary. The Tuggle decision seems to motivate the insured to unconscionable
conduct by forcing him to contract for more than indemnification at a
higher premium.
PETER C. RAY
ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES FOR
NEGLIGENCE
The plaintiff had a contract to purchase a large block of stock in the
Belcher-Young Corporation with an option to rescind if a certified finan-
cial statement revealed that the financial condition of the corporation had
changed adversely since the last statement shown to the plaintiff. The de-
fendants, certified public accountants, were engaged by Belcher to conduct
the audit and to prepare the financial statements knowing that the plain-
tiff intended to rely on their certification. The defendants were negligent
in the preparation of the financial statements, and the corporation subse-
would be afforded had the insured thereunder been involved in an accident with a
motorist who is insured under a policy of liability insurance with the minimum limits
provided under § 324.021(7). Such forms of coverage may include such reasonable
terms and conditions, including offsets which are designed to avoid duplication of
insurance and other benefits, as are commensurate with and reflected in the premium
charged therefor. The insurance commissioner shall give due consideration to the
coverage afforded in determining whether the premium therefor meets the require-
ments of Part I of Chapter 627 of the code.
Cf. Fuller, R.S., A Practical Approach to Florida's Uninsured Motorist Coverage. LL.M
THESIS, University of Miami, 1968.
